Gerd Gigerenzer

Biography

Gerd Gigerenzer is currently Director of the Harding Center for Risk Literacy at the University of Potsdam. He was previously Director of the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. He has also been a Professor of Psychology at the University of Chicago and John M. Olin Distinguished Visiting Professor, School of Law at the University of Virginia. 

He completed his Dr. phil. in Psychology at the University of Munich in 1977.


His research has focused on human decision-making and the implications of these findings for public policy.

Major Ideas

Critique of Homo Economicus as a Normative Theory

Behavioral economics has presented a challenge to Homo Economicus as a descriptive theory. However, it does not contest the validity of Homo Economicus as a normative theory. That is, it argues that while Homo Economicus does not accurately describe how individuals actually make decisions, a rational individual would adhere to its dictates: humans do not behave as the model describes, but they should.  

However, Berg & Gigerenzer (2010, pg.145-149) have argued that there is nothing to support Homo Economicus even as a normative theory. They argue that there is no evidence to suggest that deviations from this supposedly normative model result in people being worse off: there are no studies which show that deviators from rational choice theory consistently earn less money, live shorter lives, or are less happy (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010, pg.149). And if there is no evidence to suggest that deviators from rational choice theory are worse off, then, according to Berg & Gigerenzer, there is no justification for the Homo Economicus theory as a normative theory of economic behavior.

Critique of Libertarian Paternalism

Following the challenge to neoclassical economics by behavioral economists, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have developed a new political philosophy (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). Specifically, they develop a new normative account for how the state should interact with its citizenry, which they call libertarian paternalism. They claim that, in certain domains, a state enacting libertarian paternalist policies can “nudge” its citizens to make better decisions without restricting the autonomy of its citizenry to make free and independent choices.

Gerd Gigerenzer has presented a challenge to this political philosophy.

Libertarian Paternalism Assumes Well-Informed Choice Architects

Libertarian paternalist choice architects seek to exploit human cognitive limitations to nudge citizens into taking decisions that result in superior personal or societal outcomes. However, Gigerenzer (2015) has suggested that there is a contradiction inherent in this philosophy: the technocrats and behavioral scientists altering citizens’ choice architecture are also human and can therefore be subject to the same cognitive biases.

Moreover, Gigerenzer (2015) raises the possibility that lack of a scientific understanding and conflicts of interest may push choice architects to nudge patients in directions which are detrimental to their well-being. 

He points to, among other cases, the example of using behavioral insights to encourage women to perform monthly breast self-examinations. Gigerenzer then points to randomized trail data suggesting that, not only did self-examinations not reduce the risk of death from breast cancer, but they can actually cause harm in the form of an increased number of biopsies.

And he argues that health organizations have been nudging women into breast cancer screenings – by sending them appointment letters with preset times and locations - without informing the women that studies do not provide evidence that the benefits outweigh the risks. In this case, Gigerenzer argues, the nudging serves the interests of the mammography industry, does not allow the women to make informed decisions at their own health, and can actually do more harm than good to patients. 

It’s Better to Educate

 While not opposing nudging per se, Gigerenzer (2015) opposes what he deems as Thaler & Sunstein justifying libertarian paternalist policies by blaming societal problems “exclusively on the individual mind” (that is, on the cognitive limitations observed by behavioral scientists). He argues that such an approach ignores what he believes to be the more sustainable solution of educating people.

As part of his case he points to the use of nudge techniques to get women over 40 to attend cancer screenings. He argues that it would be better to educate women about the risks and causes of cancer because roughly half of cancers are due to deleterious personal behaviors such as smoking, obesity, lack of exercise, and alcohol and because nudging women into cancer screenings may save few or no lives and can even be harmful when they lead to unnecessary biopsies or surgeries. He calls for childhood school programs that aim to reduce the occurrence of cancer.

Moreover, Gigerenzer provides a counterpoint to Thaler & Sustein’s suggestion that there is no alternative to liberation paternalism (i.e. that there are many situations in which some form of organizational paternalism is unavoidable). He asks, “what if nudging stops when a different political party with other interests comes into power? What if the tobacco and fast-food industry counteracts by investing billions into nudging people into the opposite direction?” And he concludes that the only long-term sustainable solution is to educate people.  

(Learn more about libertarian paternalism and Gerd Gigerenzer’s critique of it here.)