James Nation On The Inner Workings Of The British State, Advising Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, & Running The 2024 Conservative Election Campaign

Early Life & Career

Aiden Singh: How did you get into politics and government?

James Nation: I’d always been a politics nerd as a kid growing up in a family that was very tuned into it. My parents felt their lives had been directly shaped by politics. They both moved to just outside London from Manchester and Birmingham in the 1980s to work in financial services.

They were direct examples of people who benefited from Thatcher and the broader societal changes of that decade, and they were conscious of it. As a result, ours was a politically engaged household. I also had other relatives, like my grandmother, who were deeply interested in politics.

Like many people who go into politics, we had arguments around the dinner table where you’d be sharpening your case on different issues. That was just part of life from quite an early age. So I was always a bit of a politics geek. At Oxford, politics was still in the background, particularly with some lively debates over university fees at the time.

From there, I transitioned into an interest in policy. Most young people start with politics, and only later come to policy and the question of how governments actually decide which interventions to introduce or which positions to take in particular areas.

That interest continued through my master’s in London and my first job at the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the big business lobbying group. I worked there for about four years, and in 2016 I thought, ‘This is great and all, but I’m influencing things from the outside. I want to understand how government actually works.’ At the same time, housing was a major issue in UK politics, and there were some interesting roles in the strategy function at the then Department for Housing, Communities and Local Government. I applied and eventually moved into the civil service.

I always had that political interest in the background. However, as a civil servant in the UK, you are strictly apolitical. That's part of the code. It doesn’t mean you’re oblivious to politics; you have to understand how politics shapes your job. But you cannot be political and you cannot provide party political input in your advice.

I ended up working quite closely alongside ministers in their private office roles. I had always been a Conservative, but having the experience of working directly with decision-makers gave me a bit of an itch.

To be honest, there is also a lot of luck involved. I was fortunate in that role, being close enough to ministers to get to know and make an impression. One bright, up-and-coming junior minister I got to know was Rishi Sunak. Years later, he needed a special political adviser with a policy background in the Treasury.

- - - - - - -

Civil Service vs. Political Appointments

Aiden Singh: Let's go back to your time as a civil servant and the ministries that you worked in. You began your career in government as a civil servant in the Ministry of Housing & in the Treasury before later transitioning over into politics and policy advisory. What type of things did you work on in those roles and what did a typical day in those positions look like?

James Nation: It could be a bit hot and cold in those roles, if I’m honest. Early on, I had these ill-defined strategy jobs at the Department for Housing where it wasn’t really clear what you were doing. That was largely because, at that point, we were just on the eve of, and then immediately following, the Brexit referendum. 

So the government stopped. David Cameron resigned, and then there was a Conservative leadership race. As a civil servant, at that point your focus completely changes. You’re not really getting direction from the top. Instead, you’re preparing for a new set of ministers, anticipating their priorities, and explaining the issues. I worked on everything from housing for vulnerable people to liaising with the Treasury on what our priorities as a department would be ahead of budgets or decisions the Chancellor and the Prime Minister might take.

I then got lucky with the new government coming in led by Theresa May because they produced a white paper on housing. This is basically a big set-piece announcement in the British system, where you lay out a full range of proposals on an issue and get a lot of attention from Number 10 and the Treasury. It was great to work on that.

Then I ended up in that private office role I mentioned earlier, where you really become the politician’s conduit with the department. You are responsible for executing and communicating their priorities, liaising with other parts of government, particularly the Treasury and Number 10, and working closely with them on a day-to-day basis.

It was during that job, though, that I gained the unfortunate experience of crisis management. The Grenfell Tower fire happened during that period, a tragic event that remains etched in memory as an awful moment in British politics and society more broadly. I remember there was an immediate need for crisis communications, and bearing in mind I was only in my late 20s, it was intense to respond to such a horrific situation. 

I then moved to the Treasury, with the motivation being to gain a deeper understanding of how the British state operates, for better or worse. You have to understand that the Treasury is more than just the department responsible for setting budgets and tax policy. It also oversees the interaction with financial services, which is one of the UK’s biggest sectors. Through its power and influence over other departments, it can also shape a wide range of regulatory and broader growth policies.

I kind of just knew the Treasury was the place to be. Then, almost by chance, Rishi ended up at the Treasury as chief secretary. In my Treasury role, I was again responsible for housing, leading what was called the spending team. The team’s job was essentially to advise Treasury politicians on the ‘shopping lists’ I had prepared previously in the housing department. When ministers came in, we’d give guidance such as, ‘We think we can afford this’ or ‘We think this is a good idea, Chancellor.’ At that stage, I was leading a small team. 

Then, eventually, the opportunity came up to move across to the political side.

Aiden Singh: So you make this transition from the civil service side to the political side. Can you share your thoughts on making that move? Who is it right for and when does it make sense to take that step?

James Nation: The first thing to say is that it is a big decision. As I mentioned earlier, the civil service code requires you to be strictly non-political, and I think that principle is very important for anyone in that role. The minute you show your political colors and want to work as a special adviser or political aide, it is right to leave that institution behind.

Some people in our system do return to the civil service, but it is normally at arm’s length. For example, someone who has been chief of staff to a prime minister might later become an ambassador. Technically, that is a civil service appointment, but it is very far removed from day-to-day government work. Apart from those examples, it is very rare. 

I knew that by moving across, job security would become an issue. I was entering a world where my role depended on one politician, Rishi, staying in post. It also meant leaving behind the civil service, a large and diverse institution with many opportunities.

The trade-offs for me were about opportunity: what doors could this open? Was I comfortable not being a civil servant for the rest of my life? If the answer was yes, then I had a chance to work for a very powerful and influential politician whose principles I broadly agree with. Isn’t that a quicker way to make a difference? You learn some skills on the go and can then open up other doors later in the commercial world. It really depends on your vantage point, how comfortable you are leaving the institution behind, and whether trading off job security for more influence and bigger opportunities later appeals to you.

One thing I would say, Aiden, is do not let power be your motivation. Seriously, do not let power or proximity to it drive your choices, because that can change in an instant. Trust me: one day your WhatsApps are popping off left, right, and center, and the next day they’re silent.

There is nothing quite as humbling as losing power or being aligned with the party that loses power, because your stock just disappears. So do not make that your motivation. Instead, ask yourself: Do I believe in what the Government are trying to achieve? If so, go for it. That was the calculation I made in my head. 

Aiden Singh: Which role or roles did you find to have a more long lasting impact on the country? Is it the civil service side or is it the political side?

James Nation: So I think the long-lasting term is the interesting part of this question, because it is rare on the civil service side unless you’re in a fast-paced role working in an area of high political salience where the government is making announcements or changing policy. Most of the time, there’s a lot of waiting: ideas that never go anywhere because politicians say no or the timing isn’t right, and endless preparation for what might happen, like a reshuffle or a new minister arriving. 

That said, in the areas I worked in, for example at Treasury, I felt I was strengthening the Treasury’s institutional understanding of housing policy. So when politicians later asked, “How do we achieve a particular objective?” the groundwork was already in place.

In terms of direct impact on the country, that usually comes more from the political side, because you’re closer to the minister who is actually making decisions. 

Even then, as I mentioned earlier, there are days of pure firefighting. Some days you try to move the needle on policy, but it goes nowhere. Other days, you make mistakes. The pace on the political side is relentless, which is why I’d probably lean toward political roles when it comes to the effects and impact you can have, even though the civil servants in the background are the ones who endure and carry much of the institutional work.

- - - - - - -

Intra-Government Communication

Aiden Singh: You said that when the Conservatives were in power and you were advising Rishi, your WhatsApps were always popping off. 

James Nation: Yes, and you do have to be careful, because there are rules about government business and what can be shared on WhatsApp. Still, it ends up being essential for a few reasons. 

First, you are getting direct messages from Rishi and his private office team about what he wants, updates, meetings, and so on. 

Second, you are in constant contact with special adviser colleagues across government. For example, if there’s an issue in the Home Office that requires asking the Treasury for money, it’s my job to talk to my counterpart there, understand what’s happening, coordinate the advice from the civil servants, and see if there’s a way to solve it. So you’re in constant contact with other colleagues across the government as well.

The third dynamic is stakeholders and lobbyists. These are people who somehow get hold of your number and constantly message you saying things like, “Can we get in front of him?” or “We’ve got a really interesting proposal.” You have to be very careful about how you handle that. You have to consider which ones you ignore, and which ones you push through the usual channels.

Of course, there’s another category entirely as well: life. Your parents and your partner, if you are lucky to have one, checking in. You have to cancel dinner again because work has come up. All of that is going on in the background as well.

WhatsApp and other communication channels were vital. As I mentioned earlier, when you are a special adviser or a political appointee in a department, you have to be in constant communication with your colleagues across government. You then rely on those exchanges both to brief your boss and to coordinate with the civil servants as well. This communication is vital.

To reiterate, this role really dominates your life. It demands everything: your time, your family life, your personal life. Everything has to be structured around the job, and it is hard. People who’ve done similar roles will recognize this. It’s not just the hours, though those can be brutal. It’s the fact that you always have to be present. 

The Treasury side was a bit better, but in Number 10 itself, you are reacting to events as much, if not more, than shaping them. You don’t know what’s going to come up over the weekend, whether it’s a communications issue, a press line that needs clearing, or the Prime Minister wanting a call about something that started bubbling up on Friday. It can be really hard, as people will sympathize, to just switch that off and go to the family barbecue. Some people get very good at separating the two. I struggled with that.

Aiden Singh: Does the media also try to get in touch with you?

James Nation: Well, the media are involved in the background, but my role was as a policy special adviser. I should not, and did not, speak to journalists unless I was specifically cleared to do so by my communications colleagues or the director of communications. In Westminster, and I’m sure it’s the same in the Beltway, journalists get their information by talking to different people, picking them off, and piecing things together.

It’s important to have designated special advisers on the communications side who are responsible for speaking to journalists. Otherwise, there’s a risk that reporters exploit the fragmentation to try to get the story. Ideally, you need a coherent approach to dealing with the media. Journalists wouldn’t be journalists if they didn’t find ways to pick holes in that.

- - - - - - -

“Sunak’s Problem Solver”

Aiden Singh: You’ve been described by the Guardian as Sunak’s problem solver. Do you think that label fits?

James Nation: We certainly had our fair share of problems. I’m not sure that being called the ‘solver’ is entirely accurate. The person who said that was clearly being very flattering. Though, here’s why the label stuck.

Within the Treasury and later as Deputy Head of Policy at Number Ten, I tended to be the one who would take and sort out a knotty, difficult issue with the potential to become a real headache for the government if left unaddressed. While I did work on some flagship announcements and proactive initiatives, much of the job involved Rishi saying, ‘I need you to take this file and figure out a way through it to prevent it from becoming a bigger risk.’

The tricky thing, Aiden, is that it’s hard to celebrate the successes of that role because success often meant that nothing happened. I got on top of a problem and solved it quietly. The things you remember are usually the failures, because those are the ones that broke into the open when you weren’t able to get a proper grip on them.

- - - - - - -

The Budget

Aiden Singh: So you transitioned over to the political side and you served as an adviser to Rishi while he was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 2020 to 2022. One of the most high-profile things - maybe the most high-profile thing - the chancellor does is the presenting of the budget. There’s a whole spectacle around it with the red box.

Take us inside Number 11 in the days leading up to the budget. What kinds of conversations are happening? How are the various ministries involved, if at all? And how involved is Number 10 in shaping the budget? Give us some of the background in terms of the lead-up.

It’s a pretty fun and interesting moment in politics and policy. There’s always something in that budget that people are going to hate. You’re not going to satisfy everybody.

James Nation: The first thing to say is that in the days leading up to the budget, the big decisions need to be locked-in well in advance. 

One key aspect of the British system is that the fiscal forecaster, the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), not the Treasury, is responsible for producing a range of fiscal and economic forecasts. The OBR needs all the measures and policies that will go into the budget in advance so they can plug the numbers in and produce the final forecast. That means proposals have to be submitted to the OBR weeks ahead of the budget.

There are some exceptions. For instance, as long as the aggregate spending totals on particular measures are acceptable, the OBR may not be concerned about whether you and Number 10 decide to allocate a billion to one department versus another. 

However, you cannot turn up a few days before the budget and suddenly announce a massive tax increase or cut.

Let me clarify: the government is ultimately sovereign, so could if they wanted to act. But the OBR would have no way to cost the measures or assess their impact on the economy. 

If you’re the Chancellor, you’re focused on your speech. This is a major moment in the House of Commons. You’re also concentrating on the key messages and lines you want to hit in the media afterwards.

If you’re in his team, as we were, the focus is very much on presentational risk for specific policies: where do we expect the budget to be attacked, what are our key lines, and crucially, what story do we want to tell? For each major policy, you also think about producing things like briefings, graphics, and talking points to ensure our MPs and others are effectively communicating to the public what we’re doing and what the budget is all about.

It’s both offense and defense. What stories do we want to push? Where are the areas of vulnerability? One advantage of the UK system is that because the big proposals need to be locked in early thanks to the OBR, you have time to focus on this properly. 

Let me take you back a few weeks before the budget, because that also connects to the other part of your question.

The Chancellor always receives “shopping lists” from other departments. Often, the contents of those letters somehow make their way into the press, partly to drum up pressure on the Treasury. Another reason ministers do this is to make sure Number 10 is aware of the key arguments being made. By and large, it’s a bilateral process between Number 10 and Number 11, where the key measures are agreed in a private meeting between the Chancellor and the Prime Minister. 

You’re constantly nervous about leaks. In some cases, departments or secretaries of state don’t even know what they’ve been allocated until budget day. 

In other cases, departments may be briefed in advance. If it’s a particularly significant issue and you can’t just settle it between the Treasury and Number 10, you need the relevant department involved like the Department for Work and Pensions, for example. You might also have meetings with their ministers and the Prime Minister’s team beforehand.

One area that remains especially sensitive is tax. A leak or a poorly-timed briefing can influence consumer and business behavior, so the Treasury keeps that very tightly controlled.

On the day itself, in the morning, everyone is just getting ready. The Chancellor would have an audience or a call briefing the monarch on the budget. Then it’s time for the famous photoshoot with the red box, followed by heading to the House of Commons to deliver the budget. 

This is a very high-pressure day. As a policy adviser, you’re watching the proceedings closely. You’re nervous because you want the day to go well overall for him, but you also care deeply about your specific announcements. 

As I was the spending special adviser, I tended to oversee budget announcements involving allocated funding for particular departments. For example, we had these special economic zones called freeports, which we had created with the department I used to work for. My job as a special adviser was to provide policy input but also to project-manage those initiatives to ensure they were ready for inclusion in the budget documents. All the associated briefings have to be ready. 

You’re nervous: is a journalist going to spot a hole? Is the Chancellor going to come under pressure? It’s not immediate, because the big tax and spending decisions dominate, but you do worry about what will happen over the next few days when a lot of the details start to get unpacked.

A good rule of thumb in the British system is to ask how a budget has fared by the Monday following the Wednesday it was delivered; has it survived contact with the weekend - both its big judgments and any gremlins that may have emerged.

That’s what makes you nervous on the day we announce the budget: are there any gremlins in my policy area, and am I ready?

- - - - - - -

Covid Budgets

Aiden Singh: What you’re describing is already a very intense, demanding, and stressful role, and that’s in the best of times. However, you had the unique experience of advising Chancellor Sunak during the COVID pandemic, when everything was magnified. Just as countries were going into lockdown, his very first budget in March 2020 required a £30 billion stimulus to keep the economy afloat. And his second budget was delayed because of the pandemic. Take us inside those emergency budgets.

James Nation: Well, I should clarify: I joined Rishi’s team in December 2020, so I wasn’t an official for those budgets. I wouldn’t want to claim any credit for the furlough scheme because that was before my time. Though, I worked closely with the colleagues who helped shape it. When I came in December 2020, we were still in the throes of it. If I’m not mistaken, that was ‘the Christmas that got canceled’. And the following year was the Omicron wave, so COVID absolutely dominated. I was particularly close to some of the difficult decisions over when and how to unwind parts of COVID support, not least given the significant fiscal expenditure we had to allocate toward tackling the pandemic.

One thing I always remember from when I first started working for Rishi was that he pointed to a book he said had been one of the most informative he’d read. It was Firefighting by Tim Geithner and other major figures who had been closely involved in the response to the 2008 financial crisis. As soon as he mentioned it, I made sure to read it myself to understand the mindset. And there was a line in that book that stood out. The phrase was about acting quickly to throw water on the sparks. 

That was essential during the pandemic. You couldn’t wait for perfect information before deciding on a business support package or whether to provide grants to pubs to keep them afloat. You didn’t have that luxury. Even at the highest level, questions arose: is it right to pay employers to furlough their staff rather than doing an American-style check in the post and accepting more churn in the labor market? 

On top of that, you had to grapple with the reality that the British state simply wasn’t equipped for a challenge of this scale. A lot of people have said this, and they’re absolutely right: many of the IT systems we relied on, and even the way we held personal data to reach people, just weren’t up to scratch. Once the political decision had been taken to effectively shut the economy down, you had to move extremely quickly and get ahead of the problem, all while working with imperfect delivery mechanisms.

The guiding judgment throughout was simple: act fast, move quickly, and get on top of the sparks before they spread. That’s also why hindsight makes pandemic interventions look so easy, because the knock-on problems would have been far worse if you didn’t move quickly at the time. This is what Geithner describes as well: once you get those broader knock-on, whac-a-mole problems, you quickly lose grip of the situation. 

Earlier I mentioned all the interventions we were doing without the OBR. Rishi had delivered the March 2020 budget, but then had to return with successive pandemic spending packages without the Office for Budget Responsibility weighing in.

That was a big deal for him, which brings us to the March 2021 budget: you couldn’t just leave the question of how it was all paid for. As we went along, we needed a sense of how we were going to start paying for everything, especially given the UK’s debt-to-GDP ratio had jumped so markedly as a result of the interventions.

That’s where some of the difficult tax decisions came in. You were constantly juggling the need for speed with the need to keep track of the public finances, all while acting on imperfect information and using imperfect delivery systems. That can be really uncomfortable. If you’re frozen like a rabbit in the headlights, that’s the most dangerous position to be in when you’re struck by something like a pandemic.

Aiden Singh: In this firefighter situation, we can look back to previous crises that required emergency budgets, 2008 being one example. But this crisis was different. In those earlier episodes, there was precedent and at least some lessons from history to draw on. The COVID lockdown, by contrast, was unprecedented. It was a total shutdown of the economy. It wasn’t like a fire in the banking sector where history offered a playbook.

Were there specific lessons you could adapt from past crises or did you find yourselves improvising? How much did history actually guide you in this instance?

James Nation: I think it did, in the sense that there were certain areas where lessons from 2008 carried through. A few things stand out: acting quickly, throwing water on sparks, as I mentioned earlier; making sure you had properly stocked arsenals to intervene, to use another Geithner phrase; and ensuring you prioritized support for the real economy as much as possible. That also meant having emergency powers in place so the government could move fast, which was tricky given the delivery mechanism issues.

I think the comparisons end fairly quickly, though. A financial crisis is a massive deal, but at its core it requires fiscal, financial, and monetary authorities working together to stabilize the system. This was different. You had the whole new dimension of pharmaceutical interventions, and the speed of COVID transmission created acute capacity risks for the health service. That meant relying on scientists rather than economists, which was a very new dynamic. Most countries were blindsided by that.

There might have been a flu-pandemic playbook somewhere, but nothing that looked like what we faced with coronavirus. So while there were some broad lessons on how to respond in a crisis, the reality was that much of this was improvisation. That’s why the firefighting analogy resonates. The guidance from earlier crises helped, but ultimately the blaze was of a very different nature.

This was extremely unique because of that whole different dimension of having to lock down the economy. What would that then mean in terms of human behavior? What should it mean in terms of government messaging and conveying to the public where the trade-offs might be?

So if we’re going to guarantee total safety, we have to shut the economy down. Though, that also means spending billions on employment support, and it means certain industries you care about will be hit hard. That’s a very difficult conversation to have. It became even more difficult when other countries abroad were taking very different approaches and handling COVID in particularly different ways.

Aiden Singh: The March 2021 budget included an increase in the corporate tax rate from 19% to 25% in 2023. How much was this decision influenced by the fiscal shortfalls caused by the COVID Pandemic?

James Nation: So we needed to raise revenue, and the two main measures we implemented that year were, first, an increase in the corporation tax rate, and second, freezing the thresholds for personal income tax. Freezing the thresholds effectively allowed the Treasury to benefit from fiscal drag.

That decision has proved quite controversial in recent years. However, broadly speaking, the political judgment was that the British public dislikes explicit tax increases, whereas freezing thresholds is generally more palatable. Of course, in a cost-of-living crisis, that judgment becomes much more delicate.

I do want to return to the corporation tax point. What people often forget is that alongside increasing the rate, we introduced full expensing. In fact, we went further with what was called a “super-deduction,” allowing businesses to deduct around 130% of their capital expenditures against their tax liability. 

That was an example of using the budget not just to raise revenue, but also to incentivize investment at the same time. We were still dealing with the coronavirus, but at the same time we wanted to rebalance the British tax system toward incentivizing companies to invest, particularly in capital assets. What really matters is the effective tax rate. That is, the tax you pay after allowances rather than just the headline rate.

So yes, part of the budget was about finding ways to generate revenue to pay for the pandemic response. Conversely, it was also about making sure we included measures to support growth in the British economy and help businesses recover. The full expensing policy, along with the super-deduction measure, is a good example of that approach.

- - - - - - -

To What Extent Does Economic Theory Influence Policymakers?

Aiden Singh: There’s a famous quote by John Maynard Keynes, where he says something to the effect of policymakers today are often influenced by the ideas of long-dead men. The next question touches on that idea.

In July 2022, Rishi announced his candidacy to lead the Conservative party. He made it to the final two candidates, but ultimately didn’t win that leadership contest. Liz Truss emerged as the prime minister.

During one of the debates leading up to the vote, Truss argued that inflation was primarily a monetary phenomenon that should be addressed by the Bank of England. Rishi, by contrast, took the position that there should be no tax cuts until inflation was under control, arguing that taxes do have some bearing on inflation.

So here you had two competing policy platforms with different economic approaches. When shaping Rishi’s position - his “no tax cuts until inflation is under control” stance - how much of it was grounded in economic theory? To what extent was it informed by consultations with economic advisers or by reading thinkers like Hayek and Keynes? How does one actually arrive at a policy like that?

James Nation: Well, I think you’re always aware that persistent, entrenched inflation, or sticky inflation, is highly dangerous, both politically and economically. One only needs to look at the 20th century to see that. This was Rishi’s view. He held it as Chancellor, and in fact even before the energy shock intensified concerns about inflation.

Keep in mind, UK inflation hit 11% on the consumer price index, against a 2% target. But even before that, he was concerned because of supply chain bottlenecks caused by COVID. That was always his point as Chancellor, particularly in discussions with Boris when he was prime minister: we needed to take disciplined fiscal decisions.

Otherwise, the risk is that the state becomes too parasitic, and that permanent additional borrowing fuels the inflation cycle. Economists will disagree on the extent to which the public sector contributes to this, but it undeniably does, and we are seeing examples of it now.

Without discipline on spending, the effects pass through. Public sector wage expectations have a knock-on effect on the private sector, driving up the costs of meeting those demands. Similarly, poor tax-and-spend decisions like raising a tax in a way that feeds into higher inflation also carry risks.

It’s worth remembering that in the UK, there is often an assumption that inflation can be helpful because it allows the government to inflate away debt. But much of our government debt is index-linked, so that simply isn’t the case. Higher inflation simply means higher borrowing costs, and that can create a real vicious cycle. 

The debate with Liz Truss was, in many ways, about this idea that you can just assume tax cuts will completely pay for themselves. That’s as ideological as someone on the left claiming that higher state spending and borrowing is inherently good because of the multiplier it generates. You have to demonstrate proper fiscal credibility to help bring public finances under control. History suggests that the state’s fiscal posture does indeed influence the inflationary outlook. 

While it’s not my area of technical expertise, people can certainly appraise the actions the Bank of England has taken around inflation targeting and judge whether they have been effective.

The notion that fiscal policy doesn’t matter simply doesn’t stand up to reason. Too often, people cherry-pick historical examples to suit their argument. For instance, the early years of Margaret Thatcher’s government were quite cautious, focused on getting inflation under control and repairing balance sheets, steps that later allowed for deregulation and tax cuts as the government progressed.

To go back to your question, it stemmed from a strong view he developed as Chancellor about the dangers of sticky inflation. He had a real belief, reinforced by history and by what he saw in the everyday economy, that you needed to get inflation under control before pursuing a government program focused on tax cuts, funded through spending restraint.

He believed firmly that fiscal discipline had to come first, and I think subsequent events completely vindicated that judgment.

- - - - - - -

Sunak’s First Leadership Bid

Aiden Singh: As an adviser to Rishi, that first leadership race didn’t go the way you’d hoped. Having been on the campaign trail, helping to craft the policy platform, and being fully invested in it, how did you handle the setback of not winning that first leadership contest?

James Nation: It was very difficult. Rishi did extremely well in the first phase of the leadership contest, the vote among Conservative MPs, but we knew the second phase involving the wider party membership was going to be tough.

That was partly because of the fallout from Boris Johnson’s resignation and partly because appealing to the party’s base, which is more ideological than the general public, made it harder to sell some of our policy positions. Explaining the inflation issue, for example, was challenging. As Augustine might have put it: “Lord, make me chaste… just not yet.” In our context, that meant “We will cut taxes… just not yet.” It is a difficult argument to make.

Paradoxically, as challenging as it was, it was also one of my most rewarding professional experiences. On a campaign where everyone is volunteering and you probably are not going to win, you have nothing to lose, and that creates a unique energy and camaraderie. So you may as well work with a small group of people to develop what you think is a coherent and credible policy offer for the country and try to enjoy it along the way. We certainly did, and for a while it felt a bit like working in a startup environment.

Of course, you get to September 22nd and part of you wonders “are we going to pull it off?” And when he did not, you’re disappointed because then it truly is over.

To describe it for you quickly: I lost my government job when Rishi resigned in July. I then went unpaid as a volunteer, helping to lead the policy team on the campaign. When that ended in September, you are really thinking, what am I going to do now, job-wise? There are a range of emotions, and the same strain and stress on your personal life, for sure.

- - - - - - -

Truss and Kwarteng Mini-Budget

Aiden Singh: So Liz Truss moves into Number 10 and something very extraordinary happens on September 23, 2022. The Truss government announces its mini-budget to parliament and markets are thrown into turmoil. The pound sterling falls and UK government bond yields rise. Even in what is usually a sleepy corner of the financial markets where pension funds operate, there is noticeable disruption. Mortgage pricing and related areas are all thrown into upheaval.

Rishi had argued during the leadership campaign that what Liz Truss was proposing could have these effects on the country. As all of this unfolds, what is happening in the Rishi Sunak camp? What’s going through your mind personally?

James Nation: So, being honest, even after the mini-budget, I still assumed there would be a way for her to muddle through. The real thing that eventually ended Liz Truss’s premiership was that she lost the confidence of the MPs. She lost their confidence over a particular issue in parliament around the vote on fracking. That was kind of the final straw. 

She probably was finished anyway, given the shakeout from the mini budget when Kwasi Kwarteng was sacked. Though, I tend to operate under the view that, while this is obviously tragic for the country, they will still find a way. They will announce spending cuts to reassure the markets, or something.

Then you also have the emotion that Rishi was right. You can even play some of the footage from debates and the leadership campaign; he was right. I was away on holiday when the mini-budget happened, because at that point you are just thinking you need to move on with life.

We met as a team because Rishi wanted to say thank you. He had us up to his house. It was not really a meeting of the Sunak camp. It was more like, we have all just been through something quite intense, let us reflect, and let us actually be thankful it is not us. This was around the same time as the Conservative Party Conference that year.

Then you start to think, hang on a minute, is this really happening? I had signed up to join in on the job. I hesitate to say this, but American readers will understand what I mean. It was almost exactly like that scene with Sam Seaborn and Josh Lyman in The West Wing. I was doing a client meeting, in this case a client dinner, and I got a text from the chief of staff saying we might be on again for another campaign.

Because Liz Truss had resigned, you are thinking, “what next?” There is a scene in The West Wing where that basically happens, though Josh puts up a note to Sam. I should stress as well, in no way am I describing myself as a Sam Seaborn. I should stress I am in no way claiming to be a Sam Seaborn. I am far from it.

Yet it was just like, “Wow, we are on now. Oh gosh.” Suddenly, we have to fight a very short campaign. We had not done any preparation, and we had to somehow dig out the files from the leadership campaign a few months earlier. What if Boris Johnson stood? Was he really going to win that?

Though I made the decision not to worry about that; do not worry about whether he has the numbers or the MP supporters. That is for someone else to deal with. Our job, with my eventual boss Eleanor, who is superb, was to just sit down and come up with a plan for the government. Basically, something we could hand to the civil service on the first day if we got in.

There were a range of emotions, but the key point I want to underscore is that it was not like we were continuously thinking, “When are we going to be on here?” Genuinely, I was getting on with my life. I had a new job, and then things changed just like that.

- - - - - - -

Sunak’s Second Leadership Bid 

Aiden Singh: The second leadership contest was very unique. You had just fought a leadership bid, and you had already started to move on with your life. Then suddenly you had to come back and put together another leadership campaign in a very short period of time. How did that brevity impact your role as an advisor?

James Nation: It was very different. Normally in a leadership contest you are preparing policy announcements for your candidate or helping them get ready for debates. This time it was not the primary focus. My role was very clear: do not worry about the race itself. Concentrate instead on what our plan would be if Rishi became Prime Minister. What is a concrete plan we could hand to the civil service on day one?

You need to think, as I was clearly instructed, “sit in a room and work out, across every government department, what we are saying to the new Secretary of State. What is their responsibility? What does the Prime Minister want done?” 

The common thread through all of this was crisis response. From a very risk averse perspective, the questions were: what should the early decisions be, and what are the balls we simply cannot afford to drop?

The first major early decision, which I was partially aware of but ultimately above my pay grade, was two-fold. First, to keep Jeremy Hunt as Chancellor given that he had been the key figure stabilizing the government after Kwasi Kwarteng’s sacking and the mini-budget fallout. Second, to determine the timing of a proper fiscal event that autumn. In other words, when the OBR would be asked to produce a formal forecast.

This was a critical decision made between Rishi and Hunt. It was essential to get it right, because following the turbulence of a prime minister being replaced, the fiscal event needed to land smoothly to reassure the markets and allow them to breathe a sigh of relief.

My focus then was on understanding what we needed to know across domestic policy and determining the plan for the government that would carry us through the initial volatile period. Only after that could we begin to consider what Prime Minister Sunak wanted to achieve more broadly.

One point I will make is that, because we were so focused on stabilization, we did not fully utilize the period when Rishi was at his strongest, when he had the most political capital at the start of his premiership. As a result, we were limited in our ability to pursue major proactive initiatives that could have differentiated him from his predecessor or taken steps that might have benefited the country and his position in the next election.

In those early weeks, helping the country was largely about firefighting and stabilizing the situation, rather than pursuing bold or disruptive changes. Unfortunately, that focus meant we were not able to dedicate enough time to defining Prime Minister Sunak’s premiership at a moment when public attention was at its peak. After that period, public sentiment quickly shifted to thinking, “It has been 14 years of the Conservatives, I want a change.”

- - - - - - -

Sunak’s Premiership

Domestic Policy

Aiden Singh: So you’re in Number 10. In January 2023, Prime Minister Sunak announces five domestic policy priorities: cut the debt, halve inflation, grow the economy, reduce NHS waiting lists, and stop the boats. How much progress do you think his government was able to make on these five agenda items?

James Nation: I think on the first three economic priorities, there was a lot of progress.

The problem for us, however, was that progress was measured relative to the situation left by the shakeout from the Truss government. Additionally, when there is an inflationary shock, as we can see from examples abroad, the incumbent government doesn’t get a pat on the back for bringing that back under control, or for helping to do so.

As much as I might argue that this was unfair, meaningful steps were indeed taken, with careful coordination between fiscal and monetary policy, to bring inflation back under control. Looking at the situation with inflation today - not to be party political - but it is clear that addressing such challenges requires sustained effort and focus.

So, while I initially thought we had achieved these objectives, on reflection it is much more debatable. The challenge stems in large part from the overhang of pandemic-related spending.

Forecasts were presented indicating that, according to our fiscal rules, public sector net debt as a share of GDP was projected to decline. However, when considering the UK’s overall fiscal position, the debt-to-GDP ratio still reflected a challenging backdrop.

Economic growth was similarly very tough. There were strong quarterly numbers that we ultimately handed over, but in the context of a cost of living crisis and the lingering effects of pandemic-related state interventions, voters were unlikely to recognize or give credit for those gains.

On NHS waiting lists, the major challenge remained the backlogs caused by COVID. Additionally, industrial action complicated matters, which ties back to the earlier point about the dangers of a high-inflation environment on misaligned workforce expectations.

As for stopping the boats, that was perhaps the most difficult objective because it is absolute by nature. Unlike other goals, there are no shades of grey when it comes to “stopping the boats”. Even though I would note that illegal migration numbers did decline under Rishi’s premiership and significant measures were taken on legal migration as well, with much of the current government’s touted fall in visa application numbers stemming from actions we implemented, the reality is that these results still fell far short of British voter expectations.

To claim that you are stopping the boats is to confront a deeply intractable problem unless you implement major measures. I think the current government will find this out as well: without controversial changes to the legal system, enhancements in detention capability and capacity, and addressing pull factors such as migration patterns and cooperation with France, achieving this objective is extremely difficult.

I can say it was a serious issue for the government and significant action was taken on both illegal and legal migration. However, if you publicly declare “stopping the boats,” you must be confident that you have a concrete plan to deliver it, and that represents an exceptionally high standard to meet.

Foreign Policy

Aiden Singh: Let’s turn to foreign policy. Prime Ministers often do not receive a significant boost in polling from foreign policy achievements. How does a prime minister approach balancing foreign policy priorities, which are important but may have limited political impact at home, with domestic policy objectives?

James Nation: I should clarify that my role was primarily on the domestic side. On foreign policy, there is a completely separate operation within Number 10 that manages those responsibilities for the Prime Minister. 

I think Keir Starmer is discovering this now: the temptation is always to devote a lot of time to foreign affairs.

It is easy to do as Prime Minister, given that you are meeting heads of state or prime ministers when they visit, traveling for diplomacy at forums such as the G7, G20, or NATO, and, in the case of a major crisis like Ukraine, being at the center of efforts to manage the situation. If you are, for example, reacting to American tariffs, you have to really apply yourself in dealing with a transactional president, which is something Keir Starmer is experiencing. 

Historically, foreign policy rarely gives a prime minister a sustained boost. There are exceptions, of course: for example, the Falklands War gave Margaret Thatcher a clear political uplift, whereas the Iraq War eroded Tony Blair’s authority within the Labour Party, even though he still won the general election in 2005. Apart from those exceptions, foreign policy achievements are important in themselves but rarely move the political dial. 

One notable example under Rishi was a negotiation with the European Union that was as much about domestic governance as international relations. The Windsor Framework Agreement, reached in February 2023, ensured that the Northern Ireland power-sharing assembly could govern local affairs rather than being directed from Westminster. It was a significant diplomatic accomplishment, and we felt good about it, but it did not noticeably shift polling.

I think this is where you really have to be cautious. In Number 10, it is challenging to stay focused on the issues that matter most to voters and to communicate clearly that you understand their concerns, have a coherent plan, and are delivering real results. That is no easy task. If you become too absorbed in foreign affairs, there is a real risk that it can undermine your credibility later down the line.

- - - - - - -

Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs)

Aiden Singh: Every Wednesday at noon, the prime minister appears before the House of Commons to deliver a statement and answer questions from the opposition. As an advisor to Rishi Sunak, how intense and nerve-wracking were those Wednesday sessions?

James Nation: I had excellent colleagues responsible for preparing him for Prime Minister’s Questions, particularly a man called Aidan Corley and another colleague called Sophia Faulkner. They formed a very strong team. They would be in with him during the preparation, with others playing the role of the Leader of the Opposition. 

From a policy perspective, Prime Minister’s Questions should not be too daunting. To explain what I meant, generally making policy announcements during Prime Minister’s Questions is not advisable. You cannot predict the questions that will be asked, the Prime Minister has limited time, and it is not an effective way to communicate with the public. While some people may see clips on the news, most are not actively watching.

Sometimes it is unavoidable. If there is a particular crisis or an issue developing, you might decide the Prime Minister should say something at the dispatch box, such as “we are going to bring forward legislation” or “we are going to do X or Y.” Prime Minister’s Questions can be quite useful in that context. 

In Number 10, PMQs are also a way to monitor what is happening across departments. You are asked all sorts of questions, and you can request information from those departments. If you notice something that does not look right, you can simply say, “We will have the Prime Minister address that.”

Hopefully, that will influence outcomes, though this is the exception. In general, if you are the policy advisor, you are working on government policy announcements on your own timeline, deciding when the Prime Minister should deliver a set-piece event or statement.

PMQs are also important for the morale of the building. You want to see whether your Prime Minister is performing better than the opposition. Watching closely allows you to anticipate difficult questions, identify any missteps, or uncover issues you were not previously aware of, so you can respond quickly.

Ultimately, your role is to feed into the messaging and information departments are providing. Colleagues who are actually rehearsing with him and preparing him for PMQs have the harder job on a Wednesday.

- - - - - - -

Time Management As Prime Minister

Aiden Singh: One question that comes to mind is: considering all the matters a prime minister has to manage - from taking questions at PMQs, to engaging with the media, to overseeing foreign and domestic policy, to consulting with advisers - how might a PM balance all of this?

Let me frame it this way: if someone became prime minister today and called you saying, “James, I know you have experience in Number 10. What advice can you give me on managing my time and handling all of these responsibilities?” What would you say?

James Nation: You have to do two things. First, make sure you are really in tune with what the country cares about, and what your political analysis tells you is vital to achieving and delivering what the country cares about. As prime minister, those issues and priorities are what you must focus on. 

You might go in thinking, “I’ll delegate everything. I will let ministers handle their areas, I’ll manage international affairs, and my Chancellor can take care of economic policy.” That’s a big mistake. You have to be the political driver. You need to understand the issues instinctively and, crucially, know what you were elected to do to address them.

The second point, which somewhat contrasts with the first, is that you need a highly empowered team. You have to recognize that everyone will want your time. The system’s incentives push problems toward Number 10. Very rarely, unless you have two very competent cabinet ministers, will departments naturally come to agreement. Without a concerted push from Number 10, issues just keep getting passed up.

Everyone always wants a piece of the prime minister’s attention, especially if, like in my case, they knew I was someone who cared about the details and wanted to be actively involved in solving problems. However, you also have to have a team you trust to make decisions on your behalf. You are not seeing everything, and you are not going to intervene in every case. You have to let a particular minister make that decision. Even though there are trade-offs, there are people whose judgment you can rely on to keep things away from you.

That is very hard. You need that team and support system around you to protect your time. They are not protecting your time to remove responsibility entirely; they are protecting it so you can decide where to spend your energy, driving key government priorities and communicating with the country.

- - - - - - -

Dealing With The Opposition

Aiden Singh: As Deputy Head of Policy, when crafting and preparing to present policy to the country, how much effort do you make to anticipate and prepare for whatever critiques the opposition might make of the policies you’re putting out? Or are you solely focused on constructing a good policy, and leaving aside the critiques the opposition might make for later?

James Nation: A lot of it depends on how powerful the opposition is. In my mind, you should primarily start by asking: what do we think is a good policy outcome for the country that’s in line with our values? Then you consider, where are stakeholders on this? 

It is especially important that all our MPs are supportive. If a vote in the House of Commons is required, we have to ask, where will we rely on our majority? Additionally, do we believe this aligns with both the spirit and the letter of what this government was elected to do? That was more difficult for us because we were responding very much reactively to what happened in 2022 and later in parliament.

You put the opposition in the stakeholder category. Though, frankly, if the Labour Party stands up and opposes something we’ve done in line with Conservative values, that’s fine. There will be big disagreements in politics; that’s normal. What you don’t want to do is make an administrative or technical mistake, or completely underestimate the political cost or reaction from voters, because then the opposition and the media can exploit it.

So, as I said earlier, you start with what you’re trying to achieve. You look at a Secretary of State saying, “Dear Prime Minister, here’s what I want to achieve.” Is it sensible? Does it align with our principles? Are other departments on board, particularly the Treasury, if they’re lobbying for cash or a particular fiscal intervention? How is this going to be received by stakeholders? Is the response broadly positive? How might it be critiqued? It might be criticized by Labour as unfair, but we do not think it is unfair.

So, just have your political arguments ready. Then you pause and ask yourself: have we really tested this? Is this going to upset people? Remember, the vast majority of the country does not care about politics most of the time. Could this make them care in the wrong way, for example, if we inadvertently increased their tax burden or something else? Could our political opponents exploit that? That is when you pause.

- - - - - - -

The 2024 Parliamentary Election

Aiden Singh: To what extent do you think something could have been done differently that might have changed the outcome of the 2024 Parliamentary elections? At that point, the country had six Conservative prime ministers in less than ten years. You had the mini-budget and a country wanting change. To what extent do you think the outcome was overdetermined, and to what extent could anything have been done differently to help the party win?

James Nation: I honestly felt it was going to be very, very difficult, given how it was portrayed: fourteen years of Conservative rule. I strongly disagree with the idea of “fourteen years of mismanagement,” because we had dealt with the pandemic, the energy shock, and the post-Brexit adjustment. People may have different views on the referendum, but no one would disagree that the economy needed to readjust. To put all of that at the Conservative Party’s door would be very unfair.

There were real achievements as well. Take educational attainment in English schools - that is something the party can be proud of. Politically, however, people were calling for change after a very turbulent period. The fundamentals I mentioned earlier, such as top-level macroeconomic objectives, were moving in the right direction. Inflation had been corrected and was coming down.

Voters weren’t in a great place because of issues like low productivity in the British economy and how that affected workers over time. So you knew it was going to be tough. You had to hope that putting the opposition into a campaign environment might force them to clarify their positions, have substantive debates, and present real choices. To some extent, that happened, and it’s costing the current government now. They were vague or unwilling to act during the campaign, whereas they’re doing those things today.

For me personally, leading on the manifesto with a great team, the big thing was: just do not screw it up. By “screw it up,” I meant making a mistake in that document that could be blown up in the press. The media going on about an “awful Conservative proposal to do X, Y, Z” would have added to the party’s troubles during the election campaign.

My objective was to produce a credible document. No one is going to say it was the best document in the world. Barely anyone probably read it, and people have mostly forgotten about it now. Yet, at the time, it was about doing a proper job of setting out a coherent policy platform, and I think we achieved that.

Then it became a bit like that first leadership campaign. You knew the writing was on the wall, but you were just trying to do your best professionally, because you also have to think about your own reputation for future roles. You never know what opportunities might come.

- - - - - - -

Economic & Political Challenges Today

Aiden Singh: UK public sector net debt stood at 96.3% of GDP at the end of June 2025. The UK, like the US, is running deficits at wartime levels during peacetime. How do you think this fiscal challenge should be addressed?

James Nation: Well, I think inevitably we are going to have to get better control over government expenditure and take difficult decisions. You might debate the mix of the current UK tax regime, but broadly, I do not think British voters are prepared for, and will not tolerate, a persistent European-style share of GDP in taxes.

The problem is that they also have not been willing to confront the other side of the ledger. Whoever is in power will need to take tough decisions on pensions, benefits, and welfare, because these are large areas of spending. This becomes even more challenging if other areas, like defense - which are far less popular with the British public but arguably essential given global circumstances - need to see increased investment.

So, you have to get a grip on spending, which is proving very difficult. Consider the projected expenditure pressures in the health service or ongoing welfare challenges. At some stage, the UK government will have to take a hard decision on issues like the triple lock arrangement for pension benefits. I think the markets may force this issue if the premium on UK debt continues to rise.

I do not know precisely how or when this will come to a head, but I do think it is dangerous to pursue the current path, where spending cuts are limited and the government relies on large tax increases expected this autumn without a broader plan.

Aiden Singh: The UK, like many Western nations, is facing rising interest in so-called populist parties. How serious is the threat to established parties like the Conservatives?

James Nation: I think it is real. The British electorate is the most fragmented it has been in the post-war period. For example, if a party like Reform reaches thirty percent in the polls, even though that is a relatively low vote share, it could be enough to break through and potentially become the largest party in the House of Commons.

This fragmentation is affecting both sides. The left faces challenges to Labour, while the Conservatives are squeezed by Reform on one side and the centrist Liberal Democrats on the other. Historians would not be surprised by this pattern. Major pandemics or economic crises have historically shaken up the political landscape, and we are still dealing with the fallout from such events today.

Well over a decade later, we have seen a major recalibration with our nearest trading partner, alongside changing global migration patterns, a pandemic, and an energy shock caused by the first land war in Europe since the Balkans.

All of these factors naturally provoke a reaction. You see voters frustrated by persistently low or stagnant living standards. Political turbulence at the top, like what we saw in the Conservative Party, becomes inevitable. There is also very real public frustration at what is perceived as the state’s inability to get anything done. The public sector, like other industries, was hit hard by the pandemic, and that impact lingers.

That said, anyone claiming certainty about what will happen next is misguided. The volatility and fragmentation in the electorate mean that swings are possible. Last year, the rise of Reform changed the landscape, and who knows what comes next? The one thing I can say with confidence is that uncertainty is higher than it has been for some time, and the rise of Reform is a real factor, primarily affecting the Conservative Party but also shaping Labour’s calculations.

Meeting the challenge from Reform is incredibly difficult. As a former senior advisor, I can only offer observations. The squeeze comes from both sides: not only the threat from Reform, but also the loss of seats in traditional Conservative heartlands to the Liberal Democrats. You have to appeal simultaneously to more centrist voters, who tend to care about the economy, and to voters in the Midlands’ old “red wall” who left because of economic concerns and unmet immigration promises.

Carving out a position for yourself after losing a lot of seats, when your campaigning infrastructure has taken a hit, will be difficult for anyone. There is also the challenge that this is no longer the 1990s, when you could rely on five major newspapers and place articles in outlets that were sympathetic to you. Social media has changed the landscape: it makes cutting through both incredibly easy and incredibly hard at the same time.

When you have a charismatic populist leader like Nigel Farage, he can use those platforms very effectively, being visible and vocal on key issues and reaching groups of people that you cannot reach, or at least struggle to reach. That is difficult, and it is hard to overstate how big a challenge this is for the Conservative Party.

My own view, though, is this: do not panic. The Conservative Party has endured for centuries as one of the most successful political organizations in Western history by staying true to certain core principles. The task now is to hold people together, recognizing that after a heavy defeat the public often will not listen to what you have to say for the first couple of years. During that time, the focus should be on finding opportunities to cut through and reconnect with the public on what the party stands for, while also doing the job of opposition properly.

That means using the position of official opposition in the House of Commons to hold Labour to account on the economy, and rebuilding credibility on issues like immigration by challenging the government’s plans where appropriate. 

It is very difficult. There is no easy fix. And the threat facing the party is real.

Aiden Singh: Returning to the five domestic policy priorities that Prime Minister Sunak articulated during his premiership, if one could just snap their fingers and magically resolve them, do you think that would be enough to push back against the rise of populist parties and populist sentiment? Would addressing those five issues be sufficient to stem the tide?

James Nation: I do not think it is that simple. There is a broader problem here: anyone who looks at politics solely through the lens of “delivery” is missing something important. The level of trust between the public and the governing class is at a very low ebb.

There needs to be recognition and honest communication with the public. An acknowledgment that things have gone wrong, that there are real frustrations with the direction of the country, and particularly with the state of the public realm. People want to know that those frustrations are understood.

That said, it cannot stop there. You also need to offer a narrative: here is how we can change things to address those concerns, and here is the vision of where we want to take the country. The mistake would be to think you can simply roll up your sleeves, adopt a purely technocratic approach, and manage the issues within the current system.

I do not think that is where the British public are right now. We have almost reached the stage where a politician could claim an achievement and the public would not actually believe it. That is the harder challenge. I think a lot of it comes back to communication and telling a story.

In the UK, we have not had politicians who have been able to do that for quite some time, or the ones who have managed it have had flaws in other areas. So if you tackle a core issue and reduce illegal immigration, that certainly matters. If the British economy starts to recover, that also matters. Though, I would not say that is the be-all and end-all recipe for political success. You also need to address the broader issues I was talking about.

- - - - - - -

Are There Common Traits Among Successful Politicians?

Aiden Singh: You’ve been around Rishi. You’ve been around other politicians, ministers, and people at very high levels in government. Are there common traits that they exhibit? Are there things that make for the type of person who ends up in that role? Is there anything you’ve observed that you’d comment on?

James Nation: So, all of them are impressive in their own way. You don’t get to the top job without being impressive in some shape or form. That said, as ever in life, humans have their strong points and their weak points. You always read this in books about prime ministers: if you could combine the vision of a Liz Truss with the ability to connect with the public of a Boris Johnson with the forensic detail of a Rishi Sunak, you’d have the perfect prime minister. However, that just doesn’t happen.

So, the people I observed up close are impressive, and you definitely see that. You’re not sitting there thinking, “How on earth have we ended up here?” Though, I think it’s also unrealistic to place too high demands on them. This isn’t to end on a downbeat note, but I think we are potentially in a bit of a sore spot, because I’m not sure we’re really in a world where the public is prepared to expect or accept the big limitations in their politicians and their ability to govern.

People may set aside certain personality issues or other concerns, but the idea that “politicians cannot do everything, and difficult trade-offs need to be addressed” is a conversation we have not really had properly with the public. I am not saying they do not understand these issues, but it needs to be communicated clearly and more effectively than it has been up to now.

——————

Editing by Harpreet Chohan.